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Planning Disaster
PRICE GOUGING STATUTES AND
THE SHORTAGES THEY CREATE
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the early months of 2005, the world was still reeling
from the massive tsunami which devastated large stretches of
eastern Asia, killed more than 200,000, and rendered millions
more homeless.1 Later that same year, a devastating 7.6
magnitude earthquake struck Pakistan, killing at least 87,000
people—and left three million to face winter in the Himalayan
foothills without adequate shelter.2 Domestically, residents of
the gulf coast faced three immense hurricanes in the most
Katrina, the most
active hurricane season on record.3
destructive, inundated New Orleans, damaged property and
displaced residents throughout Louisiana and Mississippi.4
Natural disasters are unavoidable, but enlightened
policies directing our response to them can have a critical
impact in easing their costs. Desperate situations often
dramatically illustrate the best in human nature, yet
unfortunately they also sometimes show us at our very worst.
Usually relegated to the latter category are those accused of
“price gouging,”5 the accusation that suppliers of goods take
advantage of the victims of disaster and, knowing their need,
charge excessively high prices, understanding that their
customers have no choice but to meet their demands. The
culmination of this distaste can be found in a number of state
laws criminalizing the practice, notably in many of the gulf

1
Carol J. Williams & Maggie Farley, Disasters Taxing Aid Capacity, U.N.
Says; In Pakistan, Relief Efforts Shift from Rescue to Providing Supplies for Isolated
Quake Victims, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2005, at A1.
2
Earthquake at a Glance, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 24, 2005, at 6A.
3
Ken Kaye, Biggest, Costliest Hurricane Season Yet, PITTSBURGH POSTGAZETTE, Nov. 30, 2005, at A1.
4
After the Flood; Hurricane Katrina, ECONOMIST, Sep. 3, 2005.
5
The term “gouging,” much like the term “murder,” has certain negative
connotations, so I will attempt to use the phrase sparingly.
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states,6 as well as in calls by members of Congress to institute
federal price gouging laws.7
It is not contradictory to hope and expect that fellow
citizens will aid each other in their time of need and still argue
that implementing price ceilings is likely to have no better
effect than to prolong that need. This Note argues that price
gouging laws, though aimed at correcting a widely perceived ill,
actually exacerbate shortages of emergency goods following
disasters, when want is greatest. This Note recommends the
repeal of state price gouging laws and, recognizing the
potential difficulties state legislators might face in doing so,
proposes a system of federal emergency relief that is, in part,
more responsive to the price mechanism. Such a system would
have the benefits of signaling need more accurately, would
encourage states to abandon artificial price ceilings, and would
provide competitive incentives for sellers to restrain price
levels.
Part II of this Note briefly describes some of the
historical, ethical, and religious prohibitions against price
gouging that demonstrate the longstanding antipathy towards
the practice.
This section also examines how these
longstanding moral concerns with “fair” prices have survived in
modern law, primarily in the form of antitrust laws and price
gouging statutes. This section will also distinguish price
gouging from antitrust laws and will describe how the antitrust
laws already prohibit the most damaging behavior
contemplated by price gouging statutes. Part III examines the
economic effects of price gouging statutes, such as the
exacerbation of shortages and the misallocative effects of
artificially low prices. This section will also discuss some of the
benefits of supporting a free market following a disaster,
including the increased likelihood of storing necessary goods
before a disaster, as well as the greater likelihood that
necessary goods will be transferred to the disaster area by
private, self-interested actors seeking to take advantage of
higher prices. Finally, Part IV of this Note concludes by
arguing that the most sensible way to avoid the harms of price
6
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-88-301 to -305 (LexisNexis 2001); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 501.160 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:732 (West 2005).
7
See Press Release, U.S. Sen. Ken Salazar, Sen. Salazar Targets Super-SUV
Gas Guzzling Loophole & Gas Price Gouging (Oct. 9, 2005), available at
http://salazar.senate.gov/news/releases/051009gasprc.htm; see also Treat Emergency
Victims Fairly Act of 2005, S. 1854, 109th Cong. (2005).
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ceilings is for states to repeal their harmful price gouging
legislation. In conjunction with such action, this Note also
recommends as a possible solution that the federal government
direct extra relief aid to areas where the price mechanism
suggests it is most in need. This last point draws upon the
economic and legal arguments presented in opposition to
current price gouging statutes to support a program that could
result in a more efficient and effective post-disaster recovery.
II.

BACKGROUND OF PRICE GOUGING STATUTES

Sellers who charge higher prices for goods that are in
short supply after a disaster face what sometimes seems like
almost universal condemnation.8 The best evidence of popular
distaste for the practice is perhaps found in the pejorative
name: “price gouging.” As a verb, “gouge” can rarely have a
positive connotation.9 Intrinsic in the term is the suggestion
that, by selling the desired goods at a higher than usual price,
the seller unnecessarily and unfairly harms the buyer;
essentially, that the seller is not playing fair. The idea that
sellers should deal fairly with their customers is hardly a new
one; indeed, notions of fair dealing in the marketplace underlie
some of the world’s earliest law.10

8
In the days following Katrina, gas prices spiked in states located far from
the eye of the storm, leading to calls for price gouging legislation. For example, both of
Oregon’s senators independently introduced bills to prohibit perceived price gouging,
the governor of Oregon joined seven other governors in demanding a congressional
investigation into possible post-disaster price gouging, and Oregon state legislators
urged the governor to call a special legislative session to pass a state anti-gouging bill.
Editorial, Gouging Consumers at the Gas Pump, OREGONIAN, Sept. 22, 2005, at D10;
see also H.R. Res. 238, 107th Cong. (2001) (passing a resolution condemning price
gouging in the wake of the September 11th attacks and urging “the appropriate
Federal and State agencies to investigate any incidents of price gouging with respect to
motor fuels during the hours and days after the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001,
and to prosecute any violations of law discovered as a result of the investigations”).
9
Among the literal meanings of the term is “to force out the eye of a person
with one’s thumb.” AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 600 (4th ed. 2002). By
comparison, the definition of “extort” is tame. Id. at 629 (“To obtain from another
through coercion or intimidation.”).
10
Hon. Sheldon Gardner & Robert Kuehl, Acquiring an Historical
Understanding of Duties to Disclose, Fraud, and Warranties, 104 COM. L.J. 168, 170
(1999).
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History of the Fair Price

From ancient times, societies have enacted systematic
rules imposing a duty on merchants to sell in good faith.11
Though evidence exists of such rules among the Babylonians,
Mesopotamians, Assyrians, and Egyptians, it was in Hebrew
culture that strong concepts of fair dealing were first strictly
enforced as essential ethical tenets.12 The Hebrew Talmud, for
example, provides that “if thou sell [ought] unto your
neighbour, or buyest ought of thy neighbour’s hand, ye shall
not oppress one another.”13 Talmudic scholars interpreted this
verse to prohibit overcharges and undercharges,14 and ruled
that in any transaction in which the profit exceeded one-sixth,
the transaction would be null and void.15 Jewish law was
skeptical that self-regulating markets could ensure fair prices,
and accordingly intervened to adjust prices that, at least in
legal terms, it deemed “unfair.”16 Aspects of Jewish law, at
least those touching on good faith dealing and full disclosure,
found their way into Roman law, where they had a significant
influence on Roman jurists,17 and consequently, on the Civil
Code countries of France, Germany, and others.18
The major Western religious traditions also address the
issue of “fair” prices. The Catechism of the Catholic Church
prohibits merchants from making pricing decisions that take
unfair advantage of those in need.19 Essentially the same
11

Id.
Id.
13
Leviticus 25:14.
14
Hershey H. Friedman, Biblical Foundations of Business Ethics, 3 J.
MARKETS & MORALITY 43, 48 (2000).
15
Id. at 49 (citing the Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metzia, 50b). Interestingly,
Talmudic scholars seemed to have a relatively sophisticated understanding of the
workings of the law of supply and demand. Professor Friedman relates the story of
Shmuel, the Talmudic sage, who was concerned with sellers raising the prices of myrtle
branches prior to Sukkot. Id. He warned the myrtle branch merchants that unless
they maintained stable prices, he would allow holiday observers to use myrtle branches
with broken tips. Id. (citing Babylonian Talmud, Sukkah, 34b). Clearly Shmuel
understood the role of increased supply as a moderating influence on price.
16
MEIR TAMARI, “WITH ALL YOUR POSSESSIONS”: JEWISH ETHICS AND
ECONOMIC LIFE 87, 87-88 (1987).
17
Gardner & Kuehl, supra note 10, at 170-71.
18
Saul Litvinoff, Good Faith, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1645, 1651-55 (1997).
19
Catechism of the Catholic Church, pt. 3, § 2, ch. 2, art. 7, available at
http://www.usccb.org/catechism/text/pt3sect2chpt2art7.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2007)
(“Even if it does not contradict the provisions of civil law, any form of unjustly taking
and keeping the property of others is against the seventh commandment: thus,
deliberate retention of goods lent or of objects lost; business fraud; paying unjust
12
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prohibition found its way into the secular norms of early
European markets, where merchants and their customers
believed that there was indeed an intrinsically fair price which
could be objectively determined.20 Market actors believed that
the sin of unfair pricing could best be avoided by trading in an
open, transparent market.21 Similarly, Islamic law prohibits
both Bay’ al-mudtarr, the exploitation of need by, for example,
charging an exorbitantly high price,22 and Ihtikar, which is
hoarding, or withholding supplies of essential goods and
services with a view to raising prices.23
Hoarding, or otherwise restricting supply to increase
prices, was understandably repugnant, and in the context of
antitrust law, is still a criminal act today.24 Recognizing the
deeply rooted sense of unfairness associated with restricting
the supply of goods with the aim of raising prices,
commentators have imagined a situation where “a man owned
one-half of the wheat in the country and announced his
intention to burn it, such abuse of ownership would not be
permitted. The crowd would kill him sooner than stand it.”25
Of course, shortages that follow a disaster are not comparable
to purposeful destruction by a monopolist of his own property,
but the statement does reflect a strong moral conviction that
social obligations exist which trump private property rights.
Common to each of these religious or ethical mandates
is the idea that the merchant must deal fairly with buyers and
that he must be prohibited from unjustly forcing up prices to
wages; forcing up prices by taking advantage of the ignorance or hardship of another.”);
see also Deuteronomy 25:13-16.
20
EDWARD CAHILL, FRAMEWORK OF A CHRISTIAN STATE 43 (1930) (“According
to medieval teaching on the other hand, the price of a commodity was supposed to be
determined by objective value alone; and could not be justly influenced by the special
need or ignorance of buyer or seller.”).
21
JEAN FAVIER, GOLD & SPICES: THE RISE OF COMMERCE IN THE MIDDLE
AGES 103 (Caroline Higgitt trans., 1998) (“[T]o the medieval mind, price
gouging . . . [was a] sin of greed, which was to be warded off by trading in an open
market, observable by all.”).
22
Mohammad Nejatullah Siddiqi, Lecture to the UCLA Int’l Inst., Islamic
Banking and Finance (Fall 2001) (transcript available at http://www.isop.ucla.edu/
article.asp?parentid=15056).
23
MISHKAT, book xii, ch. viii. (“Those who bring grain to a city to sell at a
cheap rate are blessed, and they who keep it back in order to sell at a high rate are
cursed.”).
24
See infra Part II.B. The assumption is that in order for a firm to
successfully restrict output and raise prices, there must either be collusion or some
other barrier that restricts market entry.
25
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 280 (Harcourt,
Brace and Co. 1920).
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derive an advantage at the expense of the buyer. Central to
the logic of the discussion is that there is indeed some price
which is objectively “fair” and reflects the true value of the good
in question. The general rule at common law has long been
that the courts should avoid questioning the propriety of prices
upon which parties agree, except in cases where prices are so
disparate with value that they suggest the perpetration of a
fraud.26 On the other hand, as the cases since Lochner27
suggest, the state has long had the power to interfere with
private contract rights in support of social welfare.28 In
unraveling the tension between the right of parties to
determine prices in the marketplace and the social obligations
of those parties, a useful place to start is with an examination
of the antitrust laws. Not only are the antitrust laws some of
the oldest and most firmly established consumer protection
legislation,29 but the cases interpreting the act are valuable for
the light they shed on such notions as what constitutes a “fair”
price.30
B.

Antitrust Laws

The Sherman Antitrust Act codified at the federal level
much of the judge-made and state law that had begun to
develop in response to the monopolies of the late 19th century.31
The rapid industrialization of the period required a new
corporate form, one which would allow the new industrialists to

26
See 2 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 5.15 (Joseph M. Perillo
& Helen Hadjiyannakis Bender eds., 1995).
27
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 52-53 (1905) (holding that a New York
statute forbidding bakers to work more than 60 hours a week interfered with the
freedom of contract, and therefore the right to liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment), abrogated by West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 392-93 (1937).
28
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.160 pmbl. (West 2005) (“[C]ontrol over
pricing of these commodities represents a permissible power of the state . . . .”).
29
See generally Robert Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman
Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7 (1966) (describing the legislative history of the Sherman Act and
arguing that it displays the clear and exclusive policy intention of promoting consumer
welfare).
30
See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 342 (1979) (“The essence
of the antitrust laws is to ensure fair price competition in an open market.”). There is
no evidence in the antitrust jurisprudence that antitrust analysis contemplates an
objectively “fair” price.
31
See 21 CONG. REC. S2457 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Sherman) (noting that
the proposed Act was meant to “supplement the enforcement of the established rules of
the common and statute law by the courts of the several states”).
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limit liabilities and to pool capital on an unprecedented scale.32
It is no coincidence that the new corporate form grew in
popularity along with capital intensive industries such as the
new railroads.33 The new capital markets were, if anything, too
good at their job, providing more than ample capital for new
industry and in some cases leading to over-investment.34
Despite the extraordinary costs of railroad construction,35 both
the number of railroads and the territory they covered
Competing railroads soon found themselves
exploded.36
engaged in ruinous price-cutting wars as they struggled to
attract a volume of business sufficient to make their ventures
profitable.37 Recognizing the harm of this competition to
potential profits, the railroad operators formed pools or cartels
to control output and prices.38
In contrast to the cartels of the day which limited
competition in order to enable increases in price, most people in
the late nineteenth century came to believe that it was free
competition that was essential to a healthy economy.39
Through vigorous competition, the most efficient producers
naturally rose to the top, and attempts to interfere with the
workings of competitive markets by imposing artificial
restraints would only hinder progress.40 Cartels were, of
course, anathema to the idea of competition, and as the public
32
Charles W. McCurdy, American Law and the Marketing Structure of the
Large Corporation, 1875-1890, 38 J. ECON. HIST. 631, 637-41 (1978).
33
Christian C. Day, Investor Power & Liquidity: Corporations, Capital
Markets and the Industrialization of America, 5 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 345, 376
(2001) (noting that the “emergence of capital markets neatly coincided with the
voracious demands of capital-intensive railroads”).
34
See generally JAMES W. ELY, JR., RAILROADS AND AMERICAN LAW (2002)
(relating stories of rampant speculation, imprudent overinvestment, and shockingly
generous government largesse).
35
In the early days of the industry, costs ran as high as $36,000 a mile, at a
time when $1000 was a solid middle-class income. See JOHN STEELE GORDON, AN
EMPIRE OF WEALTH 149 (2004).
36
Id. at 235 (noting that between 1860 and 1900 the number of miles of track
laid increased six-fold and that by the turn of the century “nearly every town of any
size was served by a railroad”).
37
For a discussion on the railroad price wars preceding the Sherman Act, see
generally Elizabeth Granitz & Benjamin Klein, Monopolization by “Raising Rivals’
Costs”: The Standard Oil Case, 39 J.L. & ECON. 1, 28-30 (1996).
38
ELEANOR M. FOX ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON U.S. ANTITRUST IN
GLOBAL CONTEXT 4-5 (2d ed. 1989) (describing cartels as “horizontal, loosely structured
combinations of competitors that joined forces to create large, regionally dominant
systems”).
39
SIDNEY FINE, LAISSEZ-FAIRE AND THE GENERAL WELFARE STATE: A STUDY
OF CONFLICT IN AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1865-1901, at 289 (1956).
40
Id.
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grew increasingly concerned with the power of these new
combinations41 ameliorative legislation became inevitable.42
In response, Senator John Sherman introduced the
Sherman Antitrust Act43 in 1889, which was ultimately passed
by Congress on July 2, 1890.44 Though the question of the
precise meaning of a prohibition on any “restraint of trade” has
been debated ever since,45 it is fairly clear that Congress had in
mind a fairly precise meaning for the term “monopoly.”46 The
Act protected, more than anything, the right of producers to
compete on their merits, and, in turn, the right of consumers to
enjoy the lower prices that must result from that competition.47
The legislative history surrounding the Act indicates
congressional concern for both the welfare of the consumers
and the protection of small businesses—values that some have
argued must at times inevitably come into conflict.48 What is
clear is that the Sherman Antitrust Act reflected a legislative
determination that when businesses combine in such a way as
to reduce competition, consumers suffer, and legislative bodies

41

Public concern over the increasingly concentrated power of the trusts and
cartels of the day was no doubt fueled by statements such as this by James B. Dill to
the famous muckraking journalist Lincoln Steffens: “Trusts are natural, inevitable
growths out of our social and economic conditions. . . . You cannot stop them by force,
with laws. They will sweep down like glaciers upon your police, courts, and States, and
wash them into flowing rivers.” LINCOLN STEFFENS, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF LINCOLN
STEFFENS 196 (Heyday Books 2005) (1931).
42
Id.
43
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2000).
44
FOX ET AL., supra note 38, at 11.
45
See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 278-302 (6th
Cir. 1898) (collecting cases defining “restraint of trade” at common law), modified and
aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
46
In the legislative debates, questions as to what constituted a monopoly
appeared to be resolved in a manner consistent with the common law understanding of
the term. For example, Senator George Hoar expressed that he and members of the
committee agreed that the term “‘monopoly’ is a merely technical term which has a
clear and legal signification, and it is this: It is the sole engrossing to a man’s self by
means which prevent other men from engaging in fair competition with him.” 21 CONG.
REC. 3, 152 (1890). It was equally clear to them what it is not: “a man who merely by
superior skill and intelligence . . . got the whole business because nobody could do it as
well as he could was not a monopolist.” Id. This distinction has remained an
important part of antitrust law since.
47
See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF 20 (1993) (quoting an early draft of the Sherman Antitrust Act which would
have outlawed arrangements “designed, or which tend, to advance the cost to the
consumer”).
48
See id. at 50-53 (arguing that a policy which protects smaller but less
efficient producers will always have the effect of raising prices, to the detriment of
consumers).

2007]

PLANNING DISASTER

1109

have both a right and duty to intercede on behalf of those
vulnerable consumers.49
What the Sherman Act does not guarantee, and was
never intended to guarantee, is a particular price for
consumers.50 Often times when charged with a violation of the
antitrust laws, defendants would argue that their conduct
should fall outside the scope of the Sherman Act prohibitions
because the price the alleged cartel charged was “reasonable.”51
In the landmark case Addyston Pipe & Steel,52 the government
accused six cast-iron pipe manufacturers of agreeing to fix
prices, in part, by dividing sales regions amongst themselves.53
The manufacturers argued that the common law upon which
the Sherman Act was based imposed nothing more than a
“reasonable-price” test.54 Future President and Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court William Howard Taft, at the time a judge
on the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, rejected that argument
altogether, holding that under either the common law or the
new statute, the defendants’ behavior violated the law.55
Taft’s opinion is important in that it implicitly rejected
the notion that courts can or should utilize a reasonable price
standard, noting that “the manifest danger in the
administration of justice according to so shifting, vague, and
indeterminate a standard would seem to be a strong reason
against adopting it.”56 Allowing courts to arbitrarily decide
whether a particular naked restraint of competition was
damaging or not was to “set sail on a sea of doubt,” since it

49

Id.
Or at least any price other than the competitive price.
51
See, e.g., United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 279 (6th Cir.
1898), modified and aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
52
Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 271. Defendants appealed the judgment against
them to the Supreme Court. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S.
211, 211 (1899). The lower court’s opinion was upheld, with Justice Peckham’s decision
quoting from Judge Taft’s lower court opinion approvingly. Id. at 226, 248.
53
Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 291-93.
54
Id. at 279.
55
Id. at 291 (“Upon this review of the law and the authorities, we can have
no doubt that the association of the defendants, however reasonable the prices they
fixed, however great the competition they had to encounter, and however great the
necessity for curbing themselves by joint agreement from committing financial suicide
by ill-advised competition, was void at common law, because in restraint of trade, and
tending toward a monopoly.”).
56
Id. at 284.
50
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would be nearly impossible for the courts to set any reasonable
standard of what measure of protection parties required.57
It is no cause for wonder that the Court was skeptical of
a monopolist’s desire or ability to charge only a fair or
reasonable price, and accordingly that the Court was unwilling
to consider whether a monopolist’s price was objectively fair.58
What is truly remarkable is that the antitrust laws prohibit
fixing maximum prices as well.59 The Supreme Court has held
that:
Any combination which tampers with price structures is engaged in
an unlawful activity. Even though the members of the price-fixing
group were in no position to control the market, to the extent that
they raised, lowered, or stabilized prices they would be directly
interfering with the free play of market forces.60

In Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society,61 the Court
specifically rejected the defense that setting a maximum price
sellers could charge for a service could only help consumers.62
The clear import of the Court’s reasoning in these cases is that
the antitrust laws do not necessarily guarantee low prices, only
the conditions that could lead to them.63
Antitrust law has undoubtedly worked to maintain
competition and consequently, to enhance consumer welfare.64
As is made clear by antitrust jurisprudence, however, the
Supreme Court has long recognized that the workings of a
liberal market are better able to allocate goods to consumers at

57
Id. at 283-84 (commenting that there existed “no measure of what is
necessary to the protection of either party, except the vague and varying opinion of
judges as to how much, on principles of political economy, men ought to be allowed to
restrain competition”).
58
A monopolist, like a competitive firm, seeks to maximize profits. The
monopolist accomplishes this through setting marginal revenue equal to marginal cost.
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS 343 (2d ed. 1997).
59
Given that the primary policy of antitrust law is to protect consumers
through ensuring that producers charge fair (usually understood to mean low) prices,
see BORK, supra note 47, it is notable that the Supreme Court also considers
agreements that fix maximum prices to be in violation of the Sherman Act.
60
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940). SoconyVacuum reaffirms the principle first laid down in Addyston Pipe that the purported
reasonableness of prices is of no moment in determining whether an agreement
violates the law. Id.
61
Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
62
Id. at 349.
63
Id. at 347 (“We have not wavered in our enforcement of the per se rule
against price fixing.”).
64
RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 14 (2d ed. 2001).
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the “fair” price.65 Prices are really nothing more than a
snapshot, a fleeting impression of all the relevant factors in one
moment that inform buyers’ and sellers’ market decisions at
that time.66 The Court recognized the futility, and indeed the
potential harm, of arbitrarily fixing prices: “The reasonableness
of prices has no constancy due to the dynamic quality of
business facts underlying price structures. Those who fixed
reasonable prices today would perpetuate unreasonable prices
tomorrow, since those prices would not be subject to continuous
administrative supervision and readjustment in light of
changed conditions.”67 This is not to say that antitrust law does
not or should not play a role in a post-disaster market—it can
and does.68 It is simply important to note that, in the world of
antitrust at least, the Court has recognized and reaffirmed the
idea that consumer welfare is best served by allowing markets
to operate unencumbered by “the vague and varying opinion” of
judges and well-meaning legislators.69
Antitrust laws are already well equipped to address the
genuinely manipulative behavior that price gouging statutes
purport to address.
But the justification that supports
interventions in antitrust cases, the creation of artificial
scarcity by reducing output, does not hold with the same force
in situations of natural scarcity. Holmes imagined the hostile
public reaction that would no doubt result should a monopolist
decide to burn half of his crop with a view to raising prices.70
Antitrust laws address the root of the problem, by preventing
the formation or maintenance of monopolies through
anticompetitive acts from the outset.71 Holmes’s thought
experiment would take on an entirely different dimension had
he asked how the public should react were it instead a wildfire
65

Id. at 24.
See STIGLITZ, supra note 58, at 72-73.
67
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940).
68
Incidentally, the federal government might conceivably have some power
to regulate price gouging through the Robinson-Patman Act, which prohibits price
discrimination.
69
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 283-84 (6th Cir.
1898), modified and aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
70
See supra Section II.A.
71
Recall that monopolies that grow out of the superior skill or efficiency of a
producer are not the target of antitrust law. It is said that U.S. antitrust law has a
favorite epithet: Antitrust law protects competition and consumers, not competitors; it
is not a proscription against unfairness. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,
Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977). It seems quite likely that a producer, whether a
monopolist or not, could not long maintain their dominant position by destroying half
their crop.
66
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that destroyed half the wheat crop.72 Absent some act of
negligence, it would hardly be fair to lay the blame on the
producer.
Scarcely better from a moral standpoint, and
certainly worse for everyone who needs wheat, is to address the
problem by instituting a price ceiling on the product demanded,
thereby exacerbating the shortage.73 Yet this is precisely what
modern price gouging statutes tend to do.
C.

Modern Price Gouging Statutes

Like the cases interpreting the Sherman Act, price
gouging statutes often explicitly recognize the superiority of
the marketplace in pricing consumer goods.74 Nonetheless,
citing the extraordinary impacts of disasters on the workings of
the market system, many state legislatures reasoned that the
public interest required laws to protect consumers from
excessive prices.75 New York’s legislature, for example, worried
that “during periods of abnormal disruption of the
market . . . some parties within the chain of distribution of
consumer goods have taken unfair advantage of consumers by
charging grossly excessive prices for essential consumer goods
and services.”76 Other states emphasize that “the health,
safety, and welfare of the citizens . . . depend on the availability
and affordability of certain essential commodities.”77 The
justification, then, for interfering with the right of sellers to set
72
If half the wheat crop in Holmes’s thought experiment were to burn as a
result of a natural wildfire, prices would presumably need to rise in order to induce
sellers in other countries to export wheat. If an artificial price ceiling were placed on
wheat sales, sellers and exporters would have little economic motivation to shift
supplies to this market, and shortages would almost certainly result.
73
See infra Section III for a description of the economic reasoning behind
price ceiling induced shortages.
74
See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-5101(3) (West 2006) (“Pricing of
consumer goods and services is generally best left to the marketplace under ordinary
conditions, but when a declared state of emergency results in abnormal disruptions of
the market, the public interest requires that excessive and unjustified increases in the
prices of consumer goods and services should be discouraged.”); accord ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 4-88-301 (2001); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6J-1 (2006). See also Press Release, Off. of the
N.Y. State Att’y Gen., Fifteen Gas Stations Fined in Hurricane Price Gouging Probe
(Dec. 19, 2005), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2005/dec/dec19a_05.html
(statement of New York Att’y Gen. Eliot Spitzer announcing the results of a threemonth probe against suspected price gougers: “No one begrudges a business the right
to make a profit and under normal circumstances business owners may charge
whatever price they think is appropriate. But when disaster strikes, state law requires
that price increases be linked directly and proportionately to increased costs.”).
75
See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-5101(3).
76
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 396-r (McKinney 2003).
77
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.160 pmbl. (West 2005).
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their own prices centers both on protecting the public from the
unscrupulous and ensuring the reasonable availability of
essential goods in the wake of a disaster. The price ceilings
these statutes create are unlikely to result in the realization of
either goal.
Price gouging laws respond to disaster, and
consequently most statutes require some sort of market
disrupting event: anything from a terrorist attack to a
hurricane, earthquake, or other natural disaster.78 Usually, the
President of the United States, the governor of a state, or some
other authorized local official must declare a state of
emergency.79 In addition, most statutes limit, with differing
degrees of specificity, the categories of goods subject to a
statutory price ceiling.80 Sellers have no obligation to maintain
prices on goods not covered by the relevant statutes, though
overbroad language in some statutes could conceivably cover a
wide variety of goods and services.81
The principal differences in the various statutes enacted
by the states center on what constitutes the “unfair” price.
States have adopted a number of different approaches for
78
Tennessee’s statute frequently referenced the terrorist attacks of
September 11th and specifically noted that “[t]errorist attacks can dismantle the
stability of markets and free trade.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-5101. Louisiana’s
statute was amended in 2005 to prohibit price gouging not only in the event of a
declared emergency, but also “during a named tropical storm or hurricane in or
threatening the Gulf of Mexico.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:732(a) (West 2007). New
York’s legislature, guided by experience, worried about “strikes, power failures, severe
shortages or other extraordinarily adverse circumstances.” N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 396r.
79
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-303 (LexisNexis 2001) (“Upon the
proclamation of a state of emergency . . . declared by the President of the United States
or the Governor, [or] upon the declaration of a local emergency . . . by the executive
officer of any city or county . . . it is unlawful . . . for any person . . . to sell or offer to
sell [certain goods and services] for a price more than ten percent (10%) above the price
charged immediately prior to the proclamation of emergency.”).
80
See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. 4-6-9.1-2 (LexisNexis 2002) (limiting statute to
prohibit charging excessive prices for fuel alone); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-145(A)(2)
(West 2006) (prohibiting price gouging of any “commodity” defined as “goods, services,
materials, merchandise, supplies, equipment, resources, or other articles of commerce,
and includes, without limitation, food, water, ice, chemicals, petroleum products, and
lumber essential for consumption or use as a direct result of a declared state of
emergency”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-5103 (providing that statute applies to
overcharges on “any consumer food item; repair or construction services; emergency
supplies; medical supplies; building materials; gasoline; transportation, freight, and
storage services; or housing”).
81
See, e.g., Treat Emergency Victims Fairly Act of 2005, S. 1854, 109th Cong.
§ 3(2) (2005) (defining “goods or services” to mean “goods or services of any type,
including food, transportation, housing, and energy supplies”). It is difficult to see how
subjecting every conceivable good or service to a price ceiling in a disaster can serve
any useful purpose.
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determining whether a price is “unconscionable,” which can be
broken into three basic categories: those that limit price
increases to a fixed percentage over pre-disaster prices, those
that prohibit price increases that are deemed excessive, and
those that prohibit price increases absolutely.82
Several state statutes prohibit price increases above a
certain proportion of the pre-disaster price.83 Arkansas law, for
example, penalizes sellers for any price increase of “more than
ten percent (10%) above the price charged by that person for
those goods or services immediately prior to the proclamation
of emergency.”84 Other states allow for increases of up to
twenty-five percent.85 Proportional increase price gouging
statutes present at least some pricing flexibility, but will still
result in an effective price ceiling any time the market clearing
price increases by more than the amount the statute will allow
sellers to raise prices. Sellers may also have some ability to
raise prices before a state of emergency is formally declared,
which may induce sellers to anticipate future supply
constraints by raising prices before a disaster strikes.
Other states prohibit the sale of goods at prices which
are “unconscionable,”86 reflecting the common law exception to
the rule that law will generally not look to price.87 The statutes
in these cases provide little guidance as to what price level can
be considered unconscionable, sometimes leaving it to the
courts to determine as a matter of law.88 Many states follow
the example of the New York statute, which provides the court
with guidelines of what constitutes an “unconscionably
excessive” price.89 For example, New York courts look to
82
The slight differences among the various statutes should not be
overemphasized. All statutes implementing effective price ceilings cause the same
harm, the question is only one of degree.
83
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-303(a)(1); CAL. PENAL CODE § 396 (West
2005).
84
ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-303(a)(1). The statute does allow for price
increases “directly attributable to additional costs for labor or materials used to provide
the services.” Id. § 4-88-303(a)(2).
85
See ALA. CODE § 8-31-4 (LexisNexis 2002).
86
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.160(2) (West 2005); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW
§ 396-r (McKinney 2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-527 (LexisNexis 2006).
87
See infra Part II.D.
88
See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 396-r.3 (providing that the question of
“[w]hether a price is unconscionably excessive is a question for the court”).
89
Id.; accord FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.160(1)(b) (providing that prima facie
evidence of unconscionable pricing exists where there is a “gross disparity” between the
price charged for a good in a time of emergency and the price charged in the usual
course of business in the thirty days preceding the emergency, or when the price
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whether there was a “gross disparity” between the price
charged by a seller post-disaster and the price charged
immediately prior to the disaster,90 as well as whether the price
charged by a seller “grossly exceeded” the average price in the
trade area prior to the disaster.91 Like other variations on the
theme, most statutes do allow defendants to argue that their
increased prices are directly attributable to increased costs.92
Of course, defining an “unconscionable” price as any price
which grossly exceeds the former price is hardly a model of
clarity, but it does have the virtue of allowing some room for
judicial flexibility not available in other iterations of price
gouging statutes.
Declining to adopt a vague “unconscionability” standard
or a prohibition of price increases above a certain percentage,
some states have adopted price gouging statutes which simply
provide that price increases must, as a rule, be disallowed.93
These statutes provide no room for market flexibility and fail to
recognize any change in supply relative to demand. It is
difficult to condemn this particular iteration of price gouging
statute with too much force, however, as it is only the worst in
a crop of laws which have the same essentially harmful effect.
As a group, the various state price gouging statutes
impose a wildly varying array of fines and sanctions on

charged “grossly exceeds” the average price charged in the trade area in the thirty days
preceding the emergency).
90
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 396-r.3.
91
Id.
92
Id. But see People v. Beach Boys Equip. Co., 709 N.Y.S. 2d 729 (App. Div.
2000). Defendant retailers sold generators for $1200 while other retailers in the trade
area charged less than half that price. Id. at 730. The defendant argued that his price
was attributable to additional costs imposed by its suppliers, who sold the generator to
it for $1,000. Id. The court held that the defendant had not established that the price
increase was warranted or that the bargain with the supplier was an “arms length
transaction.” Id. at 731. Though the case law is scarce, the safe-harbor provided by
justifiable price increases attributable to increased costs does not appear to afford
much protection.
93
See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:732(A) (West 2007) (“the value received
for goods and services sold within the designated emergency area may not exceed the
prices ordinarily charged for comparable goods and services in the same market area
at, or immediately before, the time of the state of emergency”); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1393.4(a) (Lexis 2000) (“It shall be an unlawful, unfair, and deceptive trade practice for
any person . . . to sell or offer for sale at retail any goods or services necessary to
preserve, protect, or sustain the life, health, or safety of persons or their property at a
price higher than the price at which such goods were sold or offered for sale
immediately prior to the declaration of a state of emergency”); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 7524-25(2) (2005).
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offenders.
Penalties include injunctive relief,94 fines and
penalties,95 restitution,96 revocation of licenses,97 and even
significant prison sentences.98 In many states, residents are
encouraged to report fellow citizens suspected of possible price
gouging violations through hotlines set up by state attorneys
general or departments of consumer protection.99 It is clear
from both the severity of the potential punishments as well as
states’ willingness to police and enforce the statutes that the
price gouging statutes are likely to ensure that merchants
comply when making pricing decisions.
The various price gouging statutes, at least where state
legislators indicated intent, reflect a general notion that social
welfare will be most enhanced by ensuring a fair price for
consumers. The means of doing so, in this case essentially
fixing a price for the duration of the disaster, has no precedent
in antitrust law. The courts interpreting the Sherman Act
expressly declined, largely for jurisprudential reasons, to fix
prices, choosing instead to rely on competitive markets to set
welfare-enhancing prices.100 Price gouging statutes instead
appear to invoke principles of the common law prohibitions on
duress and unconscionable pricing. As with the antitrust laws,
however, the common law prohibitions genuinely enhance
consumer welfare and therefore are easily distinguishable from
price gouging statutes.

94

IND. CODE ANN. § 4-6-9.1-3(2) (LexisNexis 2002); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW

§ 396-r.4.
95
ALA. CODE § 8-31-5 (LexisNexis 2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-6-9.1-3(4); N.Y.
GEN. BUS. LAW § 396-r.4; TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-5104(a) (West 2006).
96
IND. CODE ANN. § 4-6-9.1-3(3); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:734(4).
97
ALA. CODE § 8-31-5.
98
MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-25 (providing for between one and five years in
prison when violation is willful and markup is in excess of $500); S.C. CODE ANN. § 395-145 (West 2006) (providing for up to 30 days imprisonment for willful or knowing
violations).
99
See, e.g., Florida Dep’t of Agric. and Consumer Servs., Div. of Consumer
Servs., Price Gouging Is Illegal, http://www.800helpfla.com/price_gouging.html (last
visited Jan. 29, 2006); Louisiana.gov, Hurricane Information, http://katrina.louisiana.
gov/faq.htm#gouging (last visited Jan. 29, 2006); Press Release, Off. of the N.Y. State
Att’y Gen., Attorney General Cuomo Issues Warning Against Price Gouging in Wake of
Severe
Winter
Storms
(Feb.
14,
2007),
available
at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2007/feb/feb14a_07.html.
100
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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Fair Pricing Under the Common Law

Under the common law, courts generally decline to
question the adequacy of consideration in voluntary
exchanges—which is to say that they leave prices up to buyers
and sellers.101 Inadequacy of consideration “such as shocks the
conscience” may, however, serve as evidence indicating
mistake, misrepresentation, duress or undue influence.102
Fraud and misrepresentation, of course, are always proper
focuses of our system of law and appear to have similarly been
the focus of commercial morality from the earliest times.103
Likewise, an agreement secured through duress by physical
compulsion or threat of physical compulsion is voidable.104
The situation consumers face following a disaster is
often described as one of duress, where the consumer is “forced”
into a transaction in which they would otherwise not engage.105
Charging a high market price post-disaster differs in the
important respect that the seller charging the price played no
role in bringing about the circumstances leading to the supply
constraint.106 For example, if an individual threatens to shoot
another unless she is paid $100, it may indeed increase both
parties’ welfare if the put upon party purchases the “safety”
she offers, but because the extortionist created the artificial
scarcity in safety, the law does not respect the transaction.107
Any policy to the contrary would actually encourage the
thuggish behavior.108 The compelling logic behind voiding a
contract formed under duress is to remove the incentives to
create the situation in the first place, a justification which

101
See supra Part II.A; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79
(1981) (“If the requirement of consideration is met, there is no additional requirement
of . . . equivalence in the values exchanged.”).
102
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 cmt. e (1981).
103
See supra Part II.A.
104
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175-76 (1981). “If a party’s
manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat by the other party that leaves
the victim no reasonable alternative, the contract is voidable by the victim.” Id.
§ 175(1).
105
See, e.g., William Hermann, Drivers Alter Lifestyles to Deal with Gas
Prices, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Aug. 30, 2005, at 10A (quoting a consumer who likened
purchasing gasoline to “highway robbery,” stating that “we have to pay, we have no
choice”).
106
See DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAW’S ORDER 152-53 (2000) for a discussion of the
economics of duress.
107
Id. at 152.
108
Id.
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plainly does not hold when the circumstances dictating the
terms of the parties’ exchange are beyond their control.
Unlike in the duress hypothetical, in a rescue situation,
the rescuer is not responsible for the circumstances that
necessitate the rescue.109 In that sense, the situation is more
similar to a market for post-disaster necessities.110 In a rescue
situation, the party providing the service can ask any price up
to the full utility value the goods can provide, a set of
circumstances economists call “bilateral monopoly.”111 The
buyer, who must have the good and has no other alternatives,
must pay whatever the seller asks, up to the full benefit of the
good to him. In a situation where the buyer’s life is at stake—
say where he is dying of a rare disease while the seller holds
the only cure—that price might be extraordinarily high.112
Where, as here, the buyer’s agreement to the exchange was
extracted solely through his distress, neither fairness nor
efficiency supports the application of the bargain principle.113
Courts in these situations generally award a judicially
determined “fair” price for the rescue, ignoring any bargain
independently reached by the parties.114
Though the above example might superficially appear to
support a regime of price ceilings in disaster scenarios, post109
See id. at 153-56 for a discussion of the economics of rescue. Professor
Eisenberg instead uses the term “distress” to describe a situation where “party A
makes a bargain with B at a time when, through no fault of B, A is in a state of
necessity that effectively compels him to enter into a bargain on any terms he can get.”
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741,
754 (1982).
110
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 106, at 153.
111
Id. at 155.
112
Eisenberg gives the following example:

The Desperate Traveler. T, a symphony musician, has been driving through
the desert on a recreational trip, when he suddenly hits a rock jutting out
from the sand. T’s vehicle is disabled and his ankle is fractured. He has no
radio and little water, and will die if he is not soon rescued. The next day, G,
a university geologist who is returning to Tucson from an inspection of desert
rock formations, adventitiously passes within sight of the accident and drives
over to investigate. T explains the situation and asks G to take him back to
Tucson, which is sixty miles away. G replies that he will help only if T
promises to pay him two-thirds of his wealth or $100,000, whichever is more.
T agrees, but after they return to Tucson he refuses to keep his promise, and
G brings an action to enforce it.
Eisenberg, supra note 109, at 755.
113
Id. at 755-56.
114
Post v. Jones, 60 U.S. 150, 159 (1856) (“The contrivance of an auction
sale, . . . where the master of the Richmond was hopeless, helpless, and passive—where
there was no market, no money, no competition . . . is a transaction which has no
characteristic of a valid contract.”).
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disaster markets are critically different in a number of
respects. The primary difference between a distress situation
and a market for post-disaster goods centers on the number of
suppliers. Distress scenarios are premised on the concept of
bilateral monopoly.115 Recasting a traditional distress scenario
with even as few as two rescuers fundamentally limits the
bargaining power of either seller. The rescuer may still hope to
profit from the transaction, but any excessive gains will be
limited by the competing bid of her competitor.116 A rational
bidding process should result in a rescue price equal to cost
plus a reasonable profit.117 Any collusive agreement, express or
implied, between the two rescuers to charge a higher price is, of
course, a violation of the antitrust laws described in Part
II.B.118 True examples of bilateral monopoly are rare, and most
post-disaster markets will be served by multiple sellers,
negating the applicability of the doctrine for the purposes of
price gouging statutes.
Price gouging statutes are by no means a logical
extension of common law principles or even of other consumer
oriented legislation such as antitrust and antifraud laws. They
draw their moral weight from the goals they articulate, rather
than from their ability to achieve them.119 The aims of the
statutes are uniformly to protect the consumer from unfairness
and to ensure that they will be able to secure essential goods at
fair prices.120 “Fair” prices under the common law, as we have
seen, are usually the competitive prices. This is not because of
115
Bilateral monopoly is defined as the situation where the wealthmaximizing transactions fail due to the fact that each party has only one potential
trading partner and each engages in strategic behavior to appropriate the full gains of
the trade. See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN
INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 258-62 (1984).
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
See Eisenberg, supra note 109, at 756 (“When a commodity is sold under
perfect competition, the doctrine of distress would usually have no application, even to
contracts for necessities.”).
Two competitors by no means ensures “perfect
competition,” but the ability of one rescuer to extract extraordinary surplus gains
would be severely limited, provided there is no illegal collusion between the two
parties.
119
Price gouging statutes express a desire to protect consumers, but by simply
fixing prices by governmental fiat, they are unlikely to help consumers in practice.
120
The Arkansas law states that “some merchants have taken unfair
advantage of consumers by greatly increasing prices for essential consumer goods or
services.” ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-301 (2005). New York’s and Florida’s statutes
express similar concerns regarding the “unfair advantage” merchants might take of
consumers in need. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 396-r (McKinney 2003); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 501.160 pmbl. (West 2005).
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some sort of laissez-faire, libertarian fetishism, but because the
common law has often recognized the market’s extraordinary
ability to operate as an instrument of consumer welfare. Price
gouging statutes interfere with that process and palpably harm
consumers in the days and weeks following a disaster, as the
following analysis of the economics of shortages demonstrates.
III.

THE TRADITIONAL ECONOMIC VIEW

Most price gouging statutes do not provide for
prohibitions on price adjustments unless there is some sort of
triggering event which results in an “abnormal disruption” of
the market.121 New York’s statute specifically defines the
phrase “abnormal disruption” as:
[A]ny change in the market, whether actual or imminently
threatened, resulting from stress of weather, convulsion of nature,
failure or shortage of electric power or other source of energy, strike,
civil disorder, war, military action, national or local emergency, or
other cause of an abnormal disruption of the market which results in
the declaration of a state of emergency by the governor.122

Such a definition fundamentally misunderstands both the
functioning and the capability of a market. Markets are
notable for their ability to respond to changed circumstances
and, based on those circumstances, to rationally allocate goods
to their most valued users.123 Statutes which interfere with
market operations based on nothing more than “any
change . . . resulting from stress” have created a perverse
situation that handicaps markets just when the need for a
mechanism to rationally distribute goods is in greatest need.124
This section will explain how markets do that under normal
conditions, as well as what happens to supply when poorly
reasoned laws interfere with those workings.

121
See, e.g., Zeke Minaya, World Series Parking Takes Big League Bucks,
HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 26, 2005, at A6 (reporting that although sports enthusiasts
accused parking lot owners who quintupled parking prices during the World Series of
price gouging, “[a]ccording to the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, price-gouging
prohibitions are only triggered after a disaster to prevent businesses from charging
excessive prices during times of dire need”).
122
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 396-r.
123
See H. PEYTON YOUNG, EQUITY: IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 161 (1994)
(“Competitive markets allocate property both efficiently and equitably provided the
goods were equitably allocated to begin with.”).
124
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 396-r.
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Why Do Prices Rise After a Disaster?

The standard price gouging statute suggests that large
increases in prices following a disaster are indicative of a kind
of breakdown in the market system which, absent the
abnormal shock, tends to operate very well.125 That view is
mistaken; large post-disaster increases in price are a rational,
predictable, and useful response to the new circumstances of
reduced supply relative to demand, not a market failure
because of it.126 The traditional argument for why prices rise in
the wake of a disaster is a simple case of a market response to
shortages.127 The catastrophic event, whether hurricane or
terrorist attack, causes a reduction in the supply of an
available good.128 Consumers, whose need for the good has not
necessarily changed as a result of the disaster,129 bid against
one another in order to purchase the quantity of goods each
desires.130 This competitive bidding for limited supply leads to
price increases, which will continue until the market price
reaches equilibrium—that point where consumers and
suppliers have no incentive to change either price or
quantity.131
Higher prices, then, are evidence of a functioning
market, not of an abnormal disruption in market operations
requiring governmental intervention. High prices reflect the
simple fact that people need things which they cannot get, and
that they want them enough that they are willing to pay a
higher price in order to get them.132 Sellers, of course, would
happily set the price as high as buyers would willingly pay,
disaster or not.133 The ability of sellers to raise prices is
125

See supra Part III.
See YOUNG, supra note 123, at 120.
127
See STIGLITZ, supra note 58, at 110 (defining a “shortage” as a situation
when “people would like to buy something, but they simply cannot find it for sale at the
going price”).
128
Id.
129
Catastrophes will affect consumer demand for different goods in different
ways. Demand for basic goods such as food and potable water should remain the same,
although the supply of those goods might be severely constrained. Demand for goods
related to repair and response to the disaster would presumably increase, while
demand for luxury goods could be expected to decrease.
130
See STIGLITZ, supra note 58, at 89.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING
ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 9 (1994) (noting that sellers will seek to
maximize prices by selling their goods at the highest competitive price while
126
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restricted by competition with other sellers, who will try to
earn the business of buyers by offering the best price consistent
with a profit.134 Setting an arbitrary price for the goods people
wish, which is precisely what price gouging statutes do, does
not change the fundamental nature of the supply and demand
relationships just described.135 Price ceilings can, however,
result in a number of predictable harms, including shortages
and misallocation of existing supply.136
In the short run, price gouging statutes do not create
shortages so much as they prevent their remedy. The initial
shortages will normally stem from the disaster itself, perhaps
through causing increased demand for items in short supply,
by destroying stockpiled supplies of certain items, or by
preventing their re-supply. Shortages can really only be
addressed effectively through some combination of two
methods: increasing supply or allocating existing supplies more
efficiently.137 The most obviously useful method, as recognized
by the Talmudic Sage Shumuel,138 is to increase the supply of
the good in question as quickly as possible. The second option,
which becomes increasingly more important as the ability to
increase supply diminishes, is to allocate limited supplies in
such a way as to gain the most utility from their use. Price
ceilings are extraordinarily poor at doing either, and virtually
assure a third, less attractive, option: that the victims of
natural disasters will go without.
B.

Increasing Supplies

Shortly after Hurricane Rita swept through Broward
County, Florida, David Bercovicz began selling bottled water
maintaining the lowest cost possible per unit). However, there are exceptions to the
general rule that sellers will seek to maximize utility only through price. See infra
Part III.D.1.
134
See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 133.
135
See STIGLITZ, supra note 58, at 113-14.
136
See generally Edgar O. Olson, An Econometric Analysis of Rent Control, 80
J. POL. ECON. 1081 (1972).
137
The assertions are self-evident. For example, when faced with a shortage
of nurses, a hospital is necessarily faced with a limited range of options. It might
choose to hire more nurses or some close substitute who can provide the same services.
The hospital might also try to stretch its existing staff to cover its needs, perhaps by
requiring longer hours or utilizing the staff more efficiently. There is, of course, a third
option: the hospital and its patients may simply accept the shortages and go without,
an option that becomes less attractive as the service the nurses would provide becomes
more critical.
138
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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out of the back of a U-Haul for $10.00 per case of twenty-four
one-liter bottles.139 Sheriff’s deputies, after learning that a
nearby Publix grocery store was selling the same cases for half
the price, arrested him for price gouging.140 Bercovicz had
driven the water-filled truck to Broward County from the
relatively untouched city of Tampa, Florida,141 a distance of
over 200 miles.142 In so doing, Bercovicz almost certainly
violated Florida’s price gouging statute, which prohibits
charging any price which “grossly exceeds the average price” at
which the commodity was available before the storm.143 An
analysis of the social benefit of his actions, however, no matter
how self-interested the impetus, provide a useful starting point
for a discussion of the utility of a liberal post-disaster market.
Some may disapprove of what they consider Bercovicz’s
excessive avarice, especially when his gain comes at the
expense of those suffering through no fault of their own. The
assumption that the seller’s gain must come at the buyer’s
expense is, however, incorrect. No matter what one may
personally think of Bercovicz or his motives, it is clear that the
net social benefit of his actions is positive. His foray into the
retail water business is exactly the type of behavior we should
expect and, indeed, encourage. He purchased water, an
essential post-disaster good, from Tampa, where prices were
presumably low, representing its relative abundance. He then
drove them to Broward County where he was able to sell them
at a much higher price, indicative of water’s relative scarcity at
that locale.144 Nobody was required to buy his water, indeed,
the identical product was for sale at a nearby grocery store at
half the price.145 The fact that anyone was willing to purchase
Bercovicz’s water indicates that either: (1) the supply of lower
priced water was depleted, or (2) purchasing water from the
grocery store involved other costs, such as waiting in line or

139
Abhi Raghunathan, South Florida Shortages Fuel Black Market, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 29, 2005, at 1B.
140
Id.
141
Posting of Bonnie Gross to Sun-Sentinel Hurricane Weblog,
http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/weather/weblog/hurricane/archives/2005/10/
entrepeneur_or.html (Oct. 27, 2005, 21:07 EST).
142
About: Florida for Visitors, Florida Driving Distances, http://goflorida.
about.com/library/bls/bl_driving_distances.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2007).
143
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.160 (West 2005).
144
Raghunathan, supra note 139.
145
Id.
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traveling a greater distance.146 In either case the consumer is
better off than if the water they needed had stayed in Tampa,
which is no doubt where it would have remained had Bercovicz
been unable to charge more than the pre-disaster price.147
The relocation of goods from locations of relatively high
prices to those where prices are relatively low is known as
arbitrage.148 It is possible that the arbitreurs have positive
social motivations, but it is certainly not necessary. The simple
act of moving goods from where they are abundant to where
they are scarce has the beneficial effect of equalizing the prices
between the two locations.149 This is important in post-disaster
scenarios in which high prices are the result of shortages.
Arbitreurs taking advantage of the high prices will move
supplies into the areas where supplies are low, and in so doing
will increase supply and lower prices, moving the market closer
to the pre-disaster situation.150 This is especially important in
situations where government action may be considered
inadequate.151
Local suppliers—those who are not simply relocating
goods from locations of abundance to locations of scarcity—
respond to a similar set of incentives. Provided the proper
incentive scheme is in place, local suppliers arbitrage by
purchasing essential goods at a time of relative abundance and
sell at a time of relative scarcity, storing the good in the
meantime. Suppliers have little incentive to store excess goods
146
See Floridians Frustrated by Lack of Relief Supplies; Authorities Raise
State’s Death Toll to 10 as Hurricane Wilma Cleanup Continues, RECORD (KitchenerWaterloo, Ontario), Oct. 27, 2005, at A6 [hereinafter Floridians Frustrated] (reporting
that basic commodities required hours of waiting in line, up to five hours for fuel and
nine hours for water and ice).
147
This is true whether the consumer benefited indirectly from the decreased
competition for the water as a result of the removal of all the buyers who purchased
from the alternative sources, or because the consumer benefited actually purchased the
water directly from Bercovicz and thus avoided whatever alternative the consumer
decided was less attractive.
148
“Arbitrage” is defined as trading a good in different markets in which it
commands differing prices. WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 297-300 (3d ed. 1988).
149
Id.
150
Arbitrage opportunities offer the chance for high returns at little or no
risk. See STIGLITZ, supra note 58, at 241. In competitive markets, these opportunities
will quickly disappear as savvy investors purchase the relatively low priced item and
sell the relatively high priced item. Id. The process ends when the prices are
essentially the same. Id.
151
See Audrey Hudson, Storm Victims Praise Churches; Rate Response Efforts
Highest, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2005, at A1 (reporting that Louisiana residents gave
government agencies consistently low ratings for their response to Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita).
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in anticipation of increased demand at a later date unless they
can sell those goods at a price that reflects that demand and
covers their costs of interim storage. Most businesses must
keep some amount of inventory in stock at all times, the
storage of which represents a significant cost.
Profitmaximizing firms face a trade-off between the costs of holding
inventory and the risk of being unable to satisfy consumer
demand if inventories are insufficient;152 this cost-benefit
analysis continues all the way up the supply line.153
Gasoline is a prime example of a commodity where
demand is price-inelastic in the short term; that is the demand
for gasoline is not immediately sensitive to price.154 Some
researchers have suggested that in situations where consumers
are unable to shift their demand significantly in the short
term, storage of the commodity might play a role in reducing
price volatility.155 The benefits of storage capacity, however,
are necessarily limited by the availability and costs of that
capacity.156 Basically, if it costs suppliers more to store
commodities than they can be re-sold for, suppliers will have no
incentive to store.157
The common argument against both types of arbitrage—
that speculators keep goods off the market, creating shortages
and price instability—is entirely wrong.158 Indeed, the opposite
is true: the speculator wishes to buy low and sell high, but the
effect of his actions is to place upward pressure on prices when
goods are abundant and downward pressure on those same
goods when they are scarce, in effect leading to less price
volatility overall.159 It is conceivable that a single supplier
could “corner the market” by controlling all the supplies in a
given market, but in such an eventuality consumers can always
look to the antitrust laws for recourse.160

152
C. Erik Larson, Lars J. Olson & Sunil Sharma, Optimal Inventory Policies
When the Demand of Distribution Is Not Known, 101 J. ECON. THEORY 281, 286 (2001).
153
Id.
154
SEVERIN BORENSTEIN, JAMES BUSHNELL & MATT LEWIS, UNIV. OF CAL.
ENERGY INST., MARKET POWER IN CALIFORNIA’S GASOLINE MARKET 8 (2004),
http://www.energy.ca.gov/reports/2004-05-28_600-04-004.pdf.
155
Id. at 11.
156
Id.
157
Id. at 13.
158
FRIEDMAN, supra note 106, at 169.
159
Id.
160
See supra Part II.B.
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In conclusion, a market with a floating price indicative
of true supply and demand should result in increased goods
delivered from outside the region, as well as increased goods as
a consequence of speculative storage by local suppliers.161 The
consequence of increased supply will usually be to lower prices,
as suppliers compete on price in order to unload inventories.162
Increased supply, besides leading to lower prices through
competition, leads to lower costs for consumers through shorter
lines. With twice the number of suppliers, one could assume
that the time spent waiting in line would be halved. The
savings could be significant considering that some Floridians
reported spending up to nine hours in line for basic
commodities after Hurricane Wilma.163
C.

Allocating Supplies More Efficiently

Any disaster response policy hoping to increase social
welfare by ensuring adequate supplies of emergency goods
should also consider the role the price mechanism has in
efficiently allocating existing supplies. The price ceilings
created by gouging statutes inevitably result in the
misallocation of goods, both among consumers in the market
competing for goods, and between markets regulated by the
price ceiling and liberal markets.164 It is possible that some
goods, such as lodging, will not as readily lend themselves to
increased supply in the short term.165 When supply is limited
in the short term, the price mechanism provides an efficient
method of allocating goods to the most valued user.166 There
are, of course, other ways of distributing goods besides relying
on price. Indeed, when price is controlled, some other form of
allocation must play a role in distributing goods.167 Rationing of
161

BORENSTEIN, BUSHNELL & LEWIS, supra note 154.
Id.
163
Floridians Frustrated, supra note 146.
164
Paul W. MacAvoy, The Regulation-Induced Shortage of Natural Gas, 14
J.L. & ECON. 167, 169 (1971) (noting that interstate price ceilings caused “substantial
misallocations of new supplies away from the consumers the [Federal Power
Commission] was seeking to favor”).
165
The supply of lodging might not increase in response to price immediately
after a disaster, but it is possible that at least some lodging suppliers might increase
supply prior to a disaster in anticipation of the higher post-disaster price they might
expect to charge.
166
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 106, at 181.
167
Stephen Martin & Peter C. Smith, Rationing by Waiting Lists: An
Empirical Investigation, 71 J. PUB. ECON. 141, 142 (1999).
162
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some sort usually plays a role, the most familiar form of
rationing is queuing, essentially allocating goods to those most
willing to stand in line for them.168
Queuing describes the process where buyers physically
join and wait in a line to gain access to the goods they desire.169
Of course, waiting in line imposes opportunity costs to the
extent that the time spent waiting in line could be put to
productive use elsewhere.170 The addition of opportunity costs
to the nominal costs that the buyer will actually pay when he
exchanges cash for the goods he seeks plays a role in ensuring
that high value users will receive the goods.171 The concern,
however, is with the efficiency of the queuing method. Besides
the potentially tremendous expense,172 the high costs
consumers pay are essentially wasted. Neither consumers nor
suppliers benefit from the long lines. Consumers obviously
suffer, as they pay a higher price for goods. Sellers do not
benefit, since the opportunity costs of time consumers pay do
not accrue to the sellers. In short, time spent waiting in line is
wasted.
Allocating goods through queuing imposes other costs as
well. Speculators reallocate goods sold by the seller on a firstcome, first-served basis at a set price to those who are willing
to pay the most for them.173 In Florida, for example, motorists
who were unwilling to wait in line paid those who were willing
to do it for them.174 Again, allocative efficiency is enhanced in
168

Id.
Id.; see also Robert T. Deacon & Jon Sonstelie, The Welfare Costs of
Rationing by Waiting, 27 ECON. INQUIRY 179 (1989) (describing motorists confronted
with a choice between waiting in line for low priced gasoline or purchasing higher
priced gasoline without waiting).
170
Opportunity costs are the benefits sacrificed when a resource such as time
is employed for one purpose that prevents its use for another purpose. See RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 6-7 (2d ed. 1977).
171
Martin & Smith, supra note 167, at 146.
172
For example, a Florida woman reported waiting in line for nine hours at
one designated relief-supply station. She left with thirteen kilograms of ice and six
liters of bottled water. Floridians Frustrated, supra note 146. Assuming the value of
Ms. Aristil’s time is at least five dollars per hour, she essentially paid in excess of fortyfive dollars for basic supplies, a price that under Florida law is unconscionable. See
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.160 (West 2005).
173
See generally James L. Swofford, Arbitrage, Speculation, and Public Policy
Toward Ticket Scalping, 27 PUB. FIN. REV. 531 (1999) (analyzing the “scalping”
markets that arise from allocation by queuing in ticket markets).
174
See Raghunathan, supra note 139. In post-Wilma Florida, “instant
entrepreneurs” waited (or were paid to wait) in long lines to buy gasoline which they
would then resell at much higher prices. Id. (As one man, who had been paid ten
dollars to wait in line plus whatever it cost to fill a bucket with gas, said, “They didn’t
want to wait, but I’m a very patient man.”).
169
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that gasoline went to those who were willing to pay the most
for it. More problematic is the fact that the suppliers, those in
a position to get and distribute more of the product if it is
valuable to do so, share in none of the benefit. Because the
sellers do not benefit from the market transactions, the sellers
have little or no incentive to work to increase supplies.
Non-price rationing also tends to result in the creation
of illegitimate markets. The most obvious way market actors
might avoid price controls is to create black markets in the
goods they need.175 Suppliers obviously have incentives to raise
prices; and when faced with the alternative of going without
required goods, consumers in the greatest need have the
incentive to pay them.176 The predictable result is that some
consumers will pay bribes to secure the goods they need—
transactions which, if frequent enough, result in fully
developed black markets.177 Prices in the black market will
usually be higher not only than those in the regulated market,
but than the prices that could be expected in a free market,
since the costs and risks of engaging in illegal activity further
limit supplies and the only buyers will be the most desperate.178
Relying on price to allocate goods will normally result in
a more efficient allocation of existing supplies. Imagine a
situation in which a limited supply of potable water is available
post-disaster, say fifty gallons. Pricing based on market
demand normally has the advantage of assuring that a good
will go to the user who places the most value on its use. In a
market with an artificially low price, users who happen to be in
a position to purchase the water (perhaps because they were
first in line, or, in a rationing situation, were simply assigned a
quantity greater than their need) have no economic incentive to
limit the amount of their purchases. If water can be obtained
inexpensively, users might purchase water not only for
drinking, but for less valued activities, like doing the dishes or
watering a favorite plant. Allowing the price to reflect the new
realities of supply and demand ensures that the water will end
up in the hands of those that value it the most, presumably

175
Hugh Rockoff, Price Controls, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ECONOMICS, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PriceControls.html (last visited Jan.
16, 2005).
176
Id.
177
Id.
178
Id.

2007]

PLANNING DISASTER

1129

those who are most in need of it.179 This arguably favors those
with the means to purchase the water at the higher price, but
at least such a system minimizes potential waste which, when
combined with the other benefits of liberalization, results in
the greatest good for the greatest number of people.180 Selling
at competitive prices allocates goods to the buyers who place
the greatest value on them and encourages the channeling of
goods to that end.181
Even in markets where supply is inelastic in the short
term, the price mechanism plays an important allocative
function. In the market for lodging, for example, increased
prices in the short term are less likely to lead to an increase in
supply.182 Hotels take time to build, and though the prospect of
being able to charge a high price in the future might induce
some amount of additional construction pre-disaster, increased
prices resulting from an unanticipated catastrophe is unlikely
to change absolute supply significantly.
What the price
mechanism does encourage, however, is the efficient use of
existing supplies.183 High prices are likely to induce those who
have alternatives to renting a room, such as staying with
family, to do so. High prices might also induce individuals to
pool resources and to share rooms, leaving more capacity open
to others. It is clear, then, that even when supply is fixed in
179

Id.
See Eric Kades, Windfalls, 108 YALE L.J. 1489, 1547 n.223 (1999). Kades
gives the following example:
180

[C]onsider another context giving rise to frequent complaints of windfalls:
hardware stores charging high prices for everything from flashlights to
shovels in the wake of a natural disaster such as a hurricane. If the store
owner cannot raise prices in the short run (before additional supplies can
arrive), then someone may wander in and buy the last flashlight to use as a
nightlight for a mildly scared child, while the next person to rush in may
need one to search for survivors in a collapsed building. A higher price
signals less needy users to forgo consumption in favor of those in greater
need. Contrary to popular belief, then, raising prices in the wake of a
disaster is not price gouging—indeed, it may save lives.
Id.
181

See Eisenberg, supra note 109, at 757.
This holds at least in terms of arbitrage over space. No matter how
attractive lodging prices become to hotel developers, they will be unable to create
additional capacity in the short term.
183
See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1096-97
(1972); Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70
YALE L.J. 499, 502-08 (1961) (arguing that efficient resource allocation and informed
economic decision-making require that the actual and full costs of goods or services be
known and accounted for).
182
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the short term, maintaining free post-disaster markets is likely
to result in a more efficient allocation of existing supplies.
D.

Economically Vulnerable Populations and the Price
Mechanism

The primary critique levied against the liberal approach
to post-disaster markets is that a reliance on price to allocate
goods will leave the most economically vulnerable unable to
obtain the goods they need if they are forced to compete against
wealthier buyers on the basis of price.184 There are a number of
reasons why this seemingly valid concern is unfounded:
(1) many sellers maintain stable-price policies as a way of
gaining community good-will; (2) increased supply brought
about by flexible prices will reduce the proportion of emergency
goods that move through the black-market, where the poor are
least likely to compete; and (3) disaster relief programs
complementary to the economic aid available in the absence of
a disaster could easily and efficiently be made available to
those most in need. An open-market approach should also
result in net gains for those most in need.
1. Voluntary Price Stabilization
Even if the states were to repeal price gouging statutes,
it seems clear that a significant number of retailers would not
change their pricing decisions.185 If at least some suppliers
maintain prices at pre-disaster levels, consumers who are
unable to afford the market price will still be in at least as good
a position as when retailers were subject to the artificial price
ceilings. While many retailers voluntarily maintain stable
184
See, e.g., Anita Ramasastry, Assessing Anti-Price-Gouging Statutes in the
Wake of Hurricane Katrina: Why They’re Necessary in Emergencies, but Need to Be
Rewritten.
FINDLAW, Sept. 16, 2005, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ramasastry/
20050916.html (“[W]hen people are poor—as so many affected by Katrina were—ability
to pay is a poor proxy for need. Those who cannot afford to pay inflated prices, may
find themselves in desperate straits—without milk for babies, or the drinkable water,
minimum food, or important medicine needed to stay alive. We have rightly decided, in
our society, not to let people suffer this way. And in an emergency, those who are most
vulnerable need to be priced in, not priced out.”).
185
See Justin Gillis & Michael Barbaro, Revenue, the Second Flood; Retail
Sales Skyrocket as Storm Survivors Buy Generators, Gas Cans, WASH. POST, Sept. 7,
2005, at D1 (“The big national chains . . . [are] also enforcing strict policies against
price gouging.”); Don Nelson, Some Athens Businesses Feeling the Effects of Katrina,
ATHENS BANNER-HERALD (Georgia), Sept. 25, 2005 (“Lowe’s has a policy against price
gouging, and actually froze prices to pre-Katrina levels.”).
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prices even in the wake of a disaster, there is unfortunately no
empirical evidence describing either the type or number of
businesses that typically refuse to adjust their prices upward.
Intuitively, we can assume that businesses for which the
goodwill of the communities in which they operate are an
important part of the value of their enterprise will be careful to
balance short term profits available from disaster pricing with
the long term benefits of community goodwill. Home Depot, for
example, has a policy of freezing prices during a declared
emergency, even if wholesale prices rise above the retail
price.186 Of course, we cannot know whether Home Depot’s
decision is based on a rational calculation that the goodwill of
the community is worth more than the short term profits to be
had, or whether the company is simply observing the state
price gouging statutes.187 It seems likely, however, that at least
some retailers will maintain prices at the pre-disaster level,
benefiting consumers willing or able to wait in line long enough
to buy desired merchandise.188
Further, some of the most effective post-disaster
responses to the 2005 hurricanes came from non-market actors
such as churches and non-profits.189 There is no reason to
expect that free-market prices would reduce the response of
non-market actors in providing goods, as the need for relief will
still be acute. Victims of disaster who are unable to compete on
price would still have recourse to retailers who maintain stable
prices as well as to non-market actors who provide goods at
little or no cost. Introducing additional sellers, regardless of
the price they charge, will have a beneficial effect on even the
poorest of consumers because the competition for the
remaining goods will be less keen. Every person who has the
means and the will to purchase water from the back of a U186

Gillis & Barbaro, supra note 185.
It seems clear from the statutes that Home Depot, depending on the state
in which it is doing business, would not be able to raise the price of items currently in
stock to a price significantly above the pre-disaster level. However, if on re-ordering
merchandise the company faced increased wholesaler costs, it is equally clear that
most state statutes would allow the retailer to pass those prices on to consumers.
188
See Gillis & Barbaro, supra note 156 (reporting that the line for generators
at a Home Depot store began before five in the morning and grew to 600 customers by
the afternoon).
189
Hudson, supra note 151 (quoting a Louisiana State University study which
reported that “Louisiana residents were not particularly charitable when it came to
evaluating government response [to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita] . . . but were
considerably more favorable of the efforts of faith-based organizations and nonprofits,
including local community foundations and the Red Cross”).
187
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Haul truck is one less person in line at the price-stabilized
grocery store or aid station, and shorter lines mean that more
goods will be available at effectively lower prices to those who
must wait.
2. Avoidance of Black Markets
Disconnects between market prices and official prices of
goods very often lead to black market operations. In these
situations, sellers recognize that there are buyers who, for
whatever reason, are willing to pay a higher price to ensure
access to their desired goods. The higher prices on the black
market will cause the seller to divert goods away from the
legitimate market in favor of the higher prices that might be
received on the black market. Of course, the opportunities to
profit from high black market prices might draw more supply
into the market, which would have a net benefit overall, as
described above.
Markets that only allow for increased
supplies in unofficial markets, however, favor primarily those
who possess the information necessary to take part in the
illegal transactions. Markets characterized by significant
imbalance of information are less likely to perform as
efficiently as those in which information is relatively well
dispersed. Further, buyers and sellers operating on black
markets are likely to waste undue resources attempting to
avoid detection, an increased transaction cost that benefits no
one.
3. Aid Programs
It is important to recognize that the needs of the
economically vulnerable do not begin with the declaration that
a disaster related state of emergency exists nor do they end
with the disaster. The poor are often unable to compete on
price for the goods they need, not only during the aftermath of
a disaster, but in their everyday lives. For these people, the
same aid programs that ensure access to goods throughout the
year can be expanded to provide access to goods in times of
emergency. For example, the Women, Infants, and Children
(“WIC”) program provides vouchers that allow recipients to
purchase certain enumerated goods at the market price.190 The
190
See U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Food and Nutrition Serv., About WIC,
http://www.fns.usda.gov/wic/aboutwic/mission.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2006).
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retailer then presents the voucher to the program
administrator and collects the retail price that particular
retailer charges.191 A similar program could be instituted for
emergency goods. State and federal government agencies could
distribute vouchers through existing aid networks allowing the
holder to purchase enumerated goods at the prevailing market
price.192 The effective period of the vouchers could be limited to
times of declared emergency by local, state, or federal
authorities. Such a system would have the added advantage of
increasing liquidity in a potentially illiquid post-disaster
market.193
IV.

POLICY APPROACHES

In October of 2005, residents of Mexico, Cuba, and
Florida prepared themselves as one of the most powerful
storms ever recorded barreled its way across the Caribbean Sea
and towards their homes.194 The storm eventually weakened,
but still reached U.S. shores as a dangerous category III
hurricane, killing at least twenty-two people and leaving more
than five million people without electricity at least two days
after the storm.195 Wilma was remarkable in another respect: it
was the third category V hurricane in the 2005 storm season,
the highest incidence of storms of such magnitude since recordkeeping began in 1851.196 If the devastation caused by the 2005
season’s storms is suggestive of future hurricane seasons, the
need to institute policies to respond effectively should be
apparent.
191
See U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Food and Nutrition Serv., WIC and Retail Stores,
http://www.fns.usda.gov/wic/WICRetailStoresfactsheet.pdf.
192
This is only one possible approach of many. See, e.g., Posting of Gary
Becker to The Becker-Posner Blog, Comment on Price Gouging, http://www.beckerposner-blog.com/archives/2005/10/comment_on_pric.html (Oct. 23, 2005, 05:06PM)
(suggesting that in circumstances where the poorest families are unable to pay market
prices in times of famine, the government might “become active in buying rice or
whatever crop is involved, and reselling that to poor families at lower
prices . . . increase income transfers to the poor that would enable them to pay the high
market prices”).
193
See generally Geoffrey C. Rapp, Gouging: Terrorist Attacks, Hurricanes,
and the Legal and Economic Aspects of Post-Disaster Price Regulation, 94 KY. L.J. 535
(2006) (describing the potential for the collapse of the electronic payment system on
which our economy depends).
194
Andrew Ward, Wilma Builds Rapidly into a Category Five Hurricane, FIN.
TIMES (London), Oct. 20, 2005, Americas section, at 9.
195
In Wilma’s Wake, Frustration Mounts at Strained Relief Efforts in Florida,
FRONTRUNNER, Oct. 27, 2005.
196
Ward, supra note 194.
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Few lawmakers can hope to have a constituency with a
firm enough understanding of basic economic principles to
allow them to pass legislation preventing state and local
authorities from interfering with markets in times of
disaster.197 Indeed, popular calls are to increase the number of
such laws.198 Any policy response must therefore address the
obvious negative effects the imposition of price ceilings would
cause, while still respecting principles of federalism and
democracy. Calls by state legislators to repeal price gouging
statutes are likely to be met with hostility by constituents.199
Public opinion certainly must be taken into account in
proposing any policy solution. This is even true where, as here,
the evidence strongly suggests that public opinion is
misinformed about the likely effects of price ceilings, and where
the most beneficial policy response is, at first glance,
counterintuitive. Recognizing this, proponents of free postdisaster markets must admit that direct repeal of price gouging
statutes is unlikely anytime soon.
Price gouging laws do not necessarily create a collective
action problem; presumably, the converse is true. States with
price gouging laws should have greater difficulty maintaining
(and, post-disaster, attracting) supplies of emergency goods
than those states with free markets. The reason is clear: if a
supplier can either sell his gasoline in Texas’ free market for
five dollars a gallon or sell it at the statutory maximum of
three dollars in Louisiana, he will rationally choose Texas in
every instance. The Texas market will draw needed supplies,
while in Louisiana consumers will go without.
Texan
197
See Posting of Richard Posner to The Becker-Posner Blog, Should Price
Gouging in the Aftermath of Catastrophes Be Punished?, http://www.becker-posnerblog.com/archives/2005/10/should_price_go.html (Oct. 23, 2005, 05:30PM) (suggesting
that calls for price gouging statutes by the general public are prompted by “sheer
ignorance of basic economics (a failure of our educational system) and demagogic
appeals by politicians to that ignorance”).
198
See, e.g., Letter from Rep. Peter DeFazio (D-Ore.) to Governor Ted
Kulongoski (Sept. 20, 2005) (urging the governor of Oregon to organize a special
session of the state legislature to pass a bill “that would protect Oregonians from price
gouging at the pump”); Trip Jennings, Session to Suspend Gas Tax Possible; Governor
Leaning Toward Calling Legislature Back Next Month, ALBUQUERQUE J. (New Mexico),
Sept. 18, 2005, at A1 (reporting that Governor of New Mexico considering calling the
legislature into special session to pass legislation “to give New Mexicans relief from
painful gasoline and natural gas prices”).
199
A search of recent news articles failed to uncover even a single example of
a state politician calling for the repeal of an existing state price gouging statute. From
time to time, legislative bodies do manage to defeat the enactment of new legislation,
but the trend certainly seems to be toward stronger and more numerous laws creating
price ceilings.
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consumers are able to buy what they need and are better off,
even if the nominal price is higher. However, it is easier for
the consumer in Texas to gather information about nominal
price in Louisiana than it is for her to discover how much of
that good is actually available at that price. Accordingly, the
Texan voter may view the Louisiana price gouging statute as a
success in keeping prices down, while the Louisiana voter may
have difficulty in seeing the connection between the shortage of
gasoline and the harmful economic policy that contributed to it.
Instead of mandating policy or expecting an enlightened
state legislator to risk the wrath of her constituency, the
federal government should institute an incentive system that
rewards state adoption of disaster relief laws that are more in
tune with the laws of supply and demand. One aspect of such a
program might be to direct relief supplies based on the need for
those supplies as indicated by the price mechanism. High
prices for goods, as discussed above, indicate a constrained
supply relative to demand.200 The federal government could
direct relief supplies to areas where the prices for those goods
were highest, presumably those areas where the demand for
those goods are greatest. This plan would have a number of
important beneficial effects.
First, it would encourage states to abandon artificially
low price ceilings. All things being equal, states with free postdisaster markets are likely to have higher prices relative to
states that have statutorily imposed price ceilings. Some
portion of discretionary disaster aid might be earmarked to
respond to the price mechanism, that is, regions with higher
prices could be considered to have demonstrated greater need
for relief through increased supplies. Under such a plan, states
would have an incentive to let the price reflect the true demand
for the good.
Any complaint by the states that,
notwithstanding the low prices, there are few goods to sell at
the posted prices would be an implicit admission that price
ceilings tend to keep supplies low, and would perhaps play
some role in educating the public of the relationship between
price ceilings and shortages.
In addition, the possibility of governmental competition
will prevent suppliers who truly do possess monopoly power
from pricing above the competitive level. The fear of drawing
in competition in the form of emergency relief will induce
200

See supra Part III.A.
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suppliers to charge a lower price than might otherwise be
charged. Antitrust jurisprudence has long recognized the role
that the threat of potential entry by a competitor has played in
compelling monopolists to keep prices down.201 Responding to
needs based on the price mechanism might also help
consumers in situations where not even price gouging statutes
can reach. Most price gouging statutes only require that the
post-disaster price be close to the pre-disaster price in the
immediate market for the goods. In situations where a
monopolist was legally charging a monopoly price before the
disaster, neither price gouging statutes nor antitrust law can
address the needs of the affected consumers, yet those
consumers are no less deserving of aid. A price-based response
is more likely to recognize and address such need.
Finally, the price of goods might aggregate information
better than other sources of information.202 Aid providers,
much like any centrally planned system of distribution, face no
small difficulty in determining who needs how much of what.
Estimates are, at best, likely to be subject to a number of
variables which may be quite difficult to predict. Accordingly,
the market price of emergency supplies, when adjusted for
factors such as local income, might be the most efficient way to
allocate scarce goods to those most in need of them.
The basic goal of emergency relief should be to provide
disaster victims with what they need as quickly as possible.
Nothing in that mission statement implies that private, selfinterested market actions are likely to be any less effective at
accomplishing those goals than traditional disaster response
mechanisms. Therefore, it is important to recognize that state
laws which cripple the ability of the market to provide the
goods buyers need by creating or exacerbating shortages are
every bit as harmful as would be a law which hampered the
ability of nonprofits and governments to respond to disasters.
The needs of disaster victims can be met through both private,
self-interested actors as well as through government and
nonprofit responders. It is therefore essential to rally against

201
See Posner, supra note 64, at 144 (“I have thus far assumed, with the
Court, that the prospect of entry will actually affect the pricing decisions of the firms
already in a market.”).
202
This is partially dependent on the ability of aid responders to accurately
gauge prices. In most cases, this should present no significant difficulty, but the
possibility that information will be difficult to gather illustrates why price-responsive
relief should only be a part of a wider disaster response plan.
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laws which artificially interfere with the operations of a wellfunctioning market.
V.

CONCLUSION

Legislators enact price gouging statutes as a response to
their constituents’ anger and frustration at the high prices that
follow a disaster. High prices, however, may be less a
reflection of the venality of suppliers than a natural market
response to an imbalance between supply and demand.
Instituting price ceilings serves only to exacerbate the
shortages that lead to the high prices in the first place, and
certainly can have no effect in reducing such shortages.
Many buyers are understandably unhappy with the
high prices they face in the wake of a natural disaster, but
instituting price ceilings is not a reasonable remedy to the
problem. It is no doubt counterintuitive to many that fixing
prices is likely to result in decreased availability of desired
goods. Economic theory and real world experience, however,
demonstrate that this is precisely the case. It will nonetheless
remain difficult to convince the electorate of the wisdom of the
economic approach, which is why it is so important to develop
policy at the federal level to encourage the more rational
approach. As part of a comprehensive disaster response policy,
the federal government should direct some portion of aid based
on the price mechanism. In doing so, legislators should
recognize that they are not engaging in a mere social
experiment, but are instead instituting an important policy
that will result in a significant increase in material well-being
for the victims of future catastrophes.
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